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Jitnan v. Oliver, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 35
(July 7, 2011)1
JUDICIAL DISCRETION – CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE REASONING
Summary
Consolidated appeals of a district court judgment where the appellant argued that he was
prejudiced by the denial of a challenge for cause of a juror that gave inconsistent statements as to
a preconceived bias on the outcome of the case.
Disposition/Outcome
The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court abused its discretion in denying
the challenge for cause because when a prospective juror presents bias or prejudice that could
disqualify him or her and responds inconsistently on the issue later, the district court must set
forth reasons for its grant or denial of the challenge for cause on the record. However, since the
jury that decided the case was fair and impartial, no prejudicial error existed.
Factual and Procedural History
Boonsong Jitnan was injured when a vehicle driven by Ryan Oliver hit Jitnan‟s cab from
behind. Boonsong and his wife, Chanly Than (collectively, “Jitnan”), filed suit against Ryan
Oliver and his employers (collectively, “Oliver”) for injuries arising out of the accident. The
district court granted partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, holding Oliver was the
sole cause of the accident, Oliver was negligent, and Jitnan was not comparatively negligent. The
case went to trial on the issue of damages.
During jury selection, the district court asked if any of the prospective jurors had been
party to a lawsuit. Prospective juror no. 40 replied that he was sued as a result of a car accident
he caused. In further questioning, prospective juror no. 40 gave conflicting responses as to
whether he held biased views as to the damages a plaintiff could receive in a personal injury suit
and whether he could be impartial and view the evidence in this case objectively to assess an
appropriate damages award. Jitnan challenged this juror for cause, but his challenge was denied.
After the court denied his challenge for cause, Jitnan questioned the prospective juror
panel regarding the propriety of plaintiffs seeking pain and suffering damages. Juror H, who was
later served on the jury, responded that she felt “‟there is a point you can go beyond reason,‟ and
that there is „a tendency to ask for more than is what I believe is reasonable in some cases.‟”2
Juror H also expressed issues with awarding spousal damages. However, Jitnan did not challenge
Juror H for cause, suggest she was unacceptable, exercise a peremptory challenge on her, nor
inform the court that he would have used a peremptory challenge for her if prospective juror no.
4 had been dismissed for cause. Jitnan did exercise a peremptory challenge on prospective juror
no. 40, before exhausting those challenges.
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The seated jury awarded Jitnan $47,472 in damages, and he appealed.
Discussion
Abuse of discretion in denying challenge for cause to prospective juror no. 40
Jitnan argued that the district court abused its discretion in failing to disqualify
prospective juror no. 40 for cause because prospective juror no. 40 had revealed a bias that
would prevent him from serving as a juror. To determine if a prospective juror should be
removed for cause, the court must decide whether a “juror‟s views „would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions
and his oath.‟”3 It is not the expressed bias that disqualifies a juror, but the juror‟s inability to
“lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in
court.”4
Because prospective juror no. 40 stated he could not put aside his past experiences when
assessing the instant case, the Court held that the district court erred in denying the challenge for
cause without explanation. The Court did not state that all grants or denials of a challenge for
cause need to be explained. However, in cases such as the one before the Court, where a
prospective juror expresses a potentially disqualifying opinion or bias and is then inconsistent in
his or her responses regarding that preconceived opinion or bias, the district court should provide
reasoning on record to inform the parties of the basis for the decision and to facilitate informed
review.
Prejudicial error requiring reversal
While the Court found that the district court erred in not explaining its denial of Jitnan‟s
challenge for cause, the Court also found that Jitnan did not show any prejudice that would
require reversal. Noting precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States and this state,
the Court determined that the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause followed by a party‟s use
of a peremptory challenge to remove that same juror did not prejudice the party when the jury as
seated is impartial.5 Also, Jitnan failed to show actual prejudice through Juror H because he did
not raise any issues with her during voir dire, and he did not take issue with the jury as seated.
Conclusion
In denying Jitnan‟s challenge for cause to prospective juror no. 40, the district court
abused its discretion by not giving its reasons for denying the challenge for cause on the record.
However, Jitnan did not demonstrate any prejudice requiring reversal, thus the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court‟s judgment.
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